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Whatever
As has been reported, and as is claimed in his veto message, the President has pocket vetoed H.R. 1585. Wait a moment to let that first word sink in.
As relevant here, the Presentment Clause, Art. I § 7, requires that "[e]very bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; ... [i]f any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law." But Congress isn't a unitary entity; it has two chambers, and although the House of Representatives has adjourned, the Senate has not: it is continuing to meet throughout the break in an effort to prevent recess appointments by Bush. "Textually ... the clause permits the President to exercise a pocket veto any time the Congress as a whole adjourns."1 So: If one house of Congress has adjourned within the meaning of the Presentment Clause but the other house has not, has "Congress" as a group entity "adjourn[ed]" within the meaning of the clause, creating the predicate conditions for a pocket veto?
My very tentative answer - without going into any kind of originalist analysis, and I invite debate in the comments - is that the answer's "yes, but not necessarily." I think the answer is "yes" so far as this bill is concerned, and the key clue precedes the bill number: H.R. 1585. The Presentment Clause requires that "[e]very bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States." If the President doesn't approve of the bill - that is, if he wishes to veto it - "he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated"; in the circumstance that the President fails to "return[] ... [the bill] within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law." (Emphases added.) So the question becomes, what's the necessary condition for a pocket veto: the formal adjournment of "Congress" as a whole, or the inability of the President to comply with the requirement that he "return" H.R. 1585 with his objections to the House of Representatives (in which, as the bill number suggests, it originated) because that house has adjourned? My off-the-cuff answer is that the latter is the most sensible reading, which suggests the counterintuitive result that right now, President Bush can pocket-veto a bill originating in the now-adjourned House (such as this one) but not one that originated in the non-adjourned Senate.
Related: Recess appointments
Side notes on the pocket
Side notes on the pocket veto:
The relevant portion that Bush is objecting to is Section 1083 of HR 1585, which can be found here. (Be warned, it's a long bill so have your search buttons ready...) The President's objection letter is here.
The structure of the section is such that those suing the current Iraqi government for the crimes of the Saddam administration could collect from Iraqi funds in the US, which to some extent were provided BY the US for Iraqi reconstruction purposes. It would also allow plaintiff's attorneys to "freeze" any such Iraqi assets in advance of any judgement, making it a potential tool for undermining Iraqi reconstruction for political purposes.
This could be corrected by exempting the current Iraqi government from suits brought against the previous Iraqi administration of Saddam Hussein.
Section 1083 was inserted into the bill by Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), a staunch ally of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and the plaintiff's bar.
All mileages are your own.
Do Presidents Normally "Announce" Pocket Vetoes?
I always got the impression that a pocket veto happened when a President just ignored a bill past the ten day "sign-or-veto" period and Congress had adjourned some time during that period.
--Fern
Either House or Senate
can be in session. See WRIGHT v. UNITED STATES (1938)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&court=us&vol=302&invol=583
Wikipedia pocket veto:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pocket_Veto_Case
Somebody with standing needs to sue.
Not just another pocket veto
Somebody with standing needs to sue.
Why, and to what purpose? Conceding for the sake of argument that such a case would have merit under the Pocket Veto Case (and SCOTUS was quite clear in that case that "adjournment" was to be construed broadly for the sake of the ruling, the bill originated in the House which HAS recessed, etc.) to do anything about it Congress would still have to take the bill back up. The White House memorandum is quite clear that the bill IS being vetoed in BOTH senses of veto.
IOW, ignoring the Pocket Veto aspect does not change that the bill HAS been properly vetoed, and arguing the point about whether the pocket veto requirements have been fulfilled in every aspect is a technical argument in search of a purpose, as if the recess provisions are not sufficient then the usual remedies to override vetoes are directly to hand. If Congress is still "in session" Congress can make the issue moot by reconvening and overriding the veto. If Congress is not in session, the pocket veto applies.
Wright v. United States completely supports the double-barreled method of return employed in this case as being an effective veto. Justice Stone's dissent (in part, with Brandeis concurring) is also relevant. The ruling of the court in Wright was to sustain the ruling affirming the White House's veto, and Stone's dissent did not argue to change the direction of the ruling but to expand the ruling even farther to establish that Congress may not of its own actions create circumstances that effectively strip the President of veto power.
So as I said, it's an argument in search of a purpose in this case, as the bill was vetoed in both senses. If the House (where the bill originated) or Senate wants to claim that the bill can NOT be pocket vetoed on technical/definitional grounds they are still left with the actual veto, as they cannot make it impossible to return in order to strip the White House entirely of veto power. If they choose to claim the pocket veto is not applicable, they must deal with the substantive veto, and vice versa.
No loophole there. In either case, the bill HAS been vetoed, and the only question is about which veto applies, or has priority. There is thus no purpose to a suit.
(Yes, those are the two relevant cases to look at.)
Oh, and it bears mentioning
Oh, and it bears mentioning that even under Wright, in this case (unlike in Wright) the House did indeed authorize the Clerk of the House to "receive communications," so the double-barreled approach has it covered no matter how one wishes to nitpick.